

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

15 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 15 April 1969

The Director opened the meeting by introducing General Cushman to each attendee.

*DD/I reported that Governor Rockefeller will depart 11 May on the first of three scheduled visits to Latin America. In response to the DD/I's question, the Director asked the DD/I to schedule appropriate briefings for Governor Rockefeller via the usual State liaison channels.

Godfrey briefed on the North Korean shutdown last night of a U. S. Navy EC-121 aircraft over the Sea of Japan. He noted that the aircraft had apparently received three warnings, probably from CINCPAC, and that a large rescue operation was under way.

Godfrey reported that Dubcek is going to Moscow today but will return to Prague to attend Thursday's session of the plenum.

[] related that they are doing a review of NIE 11-13-69, U. S. Intelligence Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Soviet Strategic Weapons Programs. They are in receipt of a request from General Thomas, Air Force ACSI, to include some estimate of our future collection capabilities.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Carver noted that it was relatively quiet in Vietnam. In response to the Director's question, Carver noted that he was somewhat surprised at the reported candor of General Giap in his conversation with Oriana Fallaci, particularly Giap's acknowledgement of 500,000 Communist casualties.

Maury reported that the Ervin bill is scheduled for public hearings on 24 April.

Maury raised the question of exploring what relevance if any the loss of the EC-121 aircraft will have on 303 deliberations.

Houston briefed on the status of Richardson's suit against the Treasury for failure to publish the receipts of expenditures of CIA. He noted that this case was dismissed in the District court on grounds of lack of standing to sue. This was confirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

25X1

DD/P noted that C/WH will be on hand today to brief the 303 Committee on the two items pertaining to Latin America.

*The Director called attention to an 8 April memorandum from the Under Secretaries Committee outlining procedures for crisis management. He asked that the DD/I and the DD/P get together and examine this guidance in terms of our own task force procedures.

The Director announced that the Executive Director will receive the National Civil Service League Career Service Award on 13 June.

The Director suggested that those concerned read the John Finney article in the 13 April New York Times.

25X1

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

25X1

Goodwin called attention to the Mankiewicz/Braden article in today's Washington Post and to the item on the Polish defector in today's New York Times.



L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

Polish Journalist, an Ex-Consul, Asks U.S. Asylum

A Polish journalist, formerly consul in Detroit and vice consul in Chicago, yesterday made known his decision to seek asylum in the United States after years of "doubts about the basic validity of Communism."

The journalist, Zbigniew Byrski, 55 years old has been in New York with his wife on a six-month visitor's visa since January. The International Rescue Committee, of 386 Park Avenue South, intends to present his request for asylum to Federal authorities today, according to Charles Sternberg, executive director.

Mr. Byrski said he joined the Foreign Ministry in 1947 and was assigned as vice consul in Chicago and then in 1950 as consul in Detroit before he returned to Poland on vacation. He said he found he had been "kicked out" for reasons that he did not know.

He finally decided against returning to Poland while on assignment in Tanzania for the Polish Broadcasting System and the Workers Agency news service, he said.

Poland's participation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia last August, he said, shattered an illusion that "forces of liberalism"



The New York Times

Zbigniew Byrski at International Rescue Committee office

might overcome a bureaucracy that he said hated "intellectuals as potential

rebels" and was openly anti-Semitic. Mr. Byrski's wife is Jewish.

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Laird Scare Story on Soviet Missile Won't Wash

EVEN SO reasonable a man as Secretary of State William Rogers has apparently been taken in by the Pentagon's hard-working propagandists on the subject of the SS-9, or Soviet "supermissile," as it is now being called.

The belief of too many Americans that "bigger is better" is helpful to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and the generals in the campaign to make the

SS-9 into a new and frightening reason why we should spend \$6 billion to \$7 billion—for openers—on an ABM system.

There is no doubt the SS-9 is big. Secretary Rogers, at his recent press conference, referred to it as a "25-megaton missile." This is a far higher estimate than that made by the CIA, which estimates it to have a warhead capacity of 5 megatons. But there is no need to argue the point of size. Probably, the SS-9 has a bigger warhead than anything the United States now deploys—and it is still far too small to knock out more than one ICBM site, of which we have 1054.

The fact is that the SS-9 is not a first-strike weapon, no matter how many grisly (and already public) details the Pentagon "declassifies." It is not designed to destroy the U.S. ICBM system and cannot do so. It is, instead, a large warhead designed to destroy large "soft" targets, such as cities. It is—in other words—a second-strike weapon, and that's all it is.

THUS, IT DOES not change the balance of terror in any way or give the Russians some huge and mysterious advantage which should cause us to escalate the arms race.

Secretary Laird and the generals in the Pentagon have chosen to ignore this fact—for a very good reason. The reason is that the Safeguard ABM as proposed by President Nixon is not intended to protect large targets, such as cities. It is intended to protect our ICBM silos. And it is a tenable proposal only if Congress and the American people can be persuaded that the Soviets have a missile capable of destroying these silos. The SS-9, being large, meets the needs of the argument so long as the argument ignores the facts.

The facts are these: In order to threaten only the U.S. land-based second-strike capability, the Russians would have to build 2000 SS-9s, at a cost of \$25 million each. Such a program would give them a minimal chance of destroying 1000 of our Minutemen, built at a cost of \$5 million to \$6 million each. There is no evidence that they are embarking on any such ridiculous course.

And if they did it would still threaten neither our substantial fleet of submarine-borne missiles nor those carried by U.S. strategic bombers.

EVER SINCE mid-1968, when details of the SS-9

were first made public in the commercially published "Jane's All the World's Aircraft," it has been known to be inferior to the U.S. Minuteman in both reliability and launching time. Indeed, it is most comparable to our Titan I missile which we are now in the process of discarding as obsolete. To resurrect SS-9 now, as a reason for starting an ABM program, seems very close to downright deceit.

For far less money—say about \$2 billion—the United States could "superharden" all of its Minuteman sites. Roughly speaking, a super-hardened site is five times as strong as a hardened site. Thus, in order to maintain the same counterforce ability, the Russians would have to do one of the following: (1) increase the warhead size of the SS-9 by a factor of 11; or (2) double its accuracy.

Either of these is a far bigger order than penetrating the "thickest" ABM system.

In short, the much-trumpeted SS-9 is not a breakthrough in the balance of terror. It is a weapon of great horror—but of no greater horror and somewhat less efficiency than many of our own. It justifies neither panic nor the ABM.

© 1969, Los Angeles Times

Disarmament

Why Inspection May No Longer Be Critical for Arms Control

WASHINGTON—For the past decade every significant arms control proposal has run afoul of the issue of inspection. Now for a fleeting moment, thanks to a development nobody wants to talk about, the two superpowers may have a chance to reach some arms control agreements without the odious requirement of intrusive on-site inspections.

One of those rare concatenations is happening where a political interest in limiting strategic weapons is being reinforced by a technical development permitting such an agreement to be verified.

The development involves one of the most remarkable and yet unsung accomplishments of the space age—reconnaissance satellites that can perform feats of intelligence beyond the capacity of the best cloak-and-dagger spy. More important in terms of arms control agreements, these satellites, from unseen altitudes of 100 miles or so, can substitute in many ways for the on-site in-

spector.

The United States hinted at the possibility of using reconnaissance satellites to monitor an arms control agreement last week at the Geneva disarmament conference when it modified its proposal for a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for atomic weapons. In the past, to verify such an agreement, the United States had proposed that there be inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of all the plutonium reactors, uranium gaseous diffusion plants and chemical separation centers which the nuclear powers declared were no longer producing materials for weapons.

In addition, the United States had proposed that each side have the right of on-site inspection to check on "undeclared" plants that might still be in clandestine production. It is this latter demand that the United States dropped. The reason, although it was never explicitly stated, was

that this country now can rely on reconnaissance satellites to check for clandestine plants.

The American proposal was summarily rejected as really nothing new by Aleksel N. Roshchin, the Soviet delegate to the conference. Furthermore, he objected that the proposal would not contribute to the reduction of existing atomic arsenals and was "caused mainly by the overproduction of nuclear materials designed for military uses in the U.S.A."

There was some merit in Mr. Roshchin's objection. The United States now has so many nuclear warheads that it can cannibalize obsolete weapons to obtain most if not all the fissionable materials it needs for new weapons. Thus a cutoff in fissionable materials production would not necessarily lead to any significant reduction in existing arsenals, although it might place some constraints on the development of new weapons systems, such as a ballistic mis-

sile defense system with its thousands of warheads.

But in summarily rejecting the proposal, the Soviet Union may have overlooked its underlying significance. For all the acknowledged one-upmanship in the proposal, the United States also was sending up a signal that it was ready to consider using "national means of verification" to monitor some types of arms control agreements, such as a limitation on strategic missiles.

"National means of verification" is the euphemism used for reconnaissance satellites. It is so euphemistic that even disarmament officials are under some constraints in describing the new opportunities for arms controls that have been opened up by these satellites.

Thus, in the April issue of Foreign Affairs, William C. Foster, the former director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commented that "our verification capabilities us-

ing 'national means' alone are considerably greater than it has been possible, so far, to reveal."

The reconnaissance satellites circle the earth on a regular basis, sending back packets of film that are routinely recovered by planes over the Pacific. The method of re-entry into the atmosphere is similar to that for manned capsules. A plane with a trapezoid device then catches the vehicle's parachute shrouds.

The United States has never officially acknowledged the existence of these satellites. There have been some hints, however, of their remarkable photographic capacity.

Sen. George D. Aiken, a member of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, observed last week that from an altitude of 50 miles a reconnaissance satellite could detect a postage stamp. That may be something of an exaggeration, but not much. With little difficulty, it could detect whether a table

cloth had been placed over a small picnic table.

In recent weeks there have been some hints from high Administration officials on the kind of intelligence information that can be obtained from these satellites. Thus at his March 14 news conference, President Nixon noted that the Soviet Union has deployed 67 ABMs around Moscow. And then before Congressional committees, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird disclosed that the Soviet Union has constructed two shipyards for turning out atomic submarines.

This information undoubtedly was obtained from reconnaissance satellites, and yet the Administration would never admit that. Indeed, there was considerable private consternation when the President used the exact figure of 67 ABMs—a figure that had been treated until then as a top secret to conceal the capacities of the satellites.

These satellites can even deter-

mine to a large extent what the Russians are doing behind closed doors. It is possible to tell whether a building houses a gaseous diffusion plant or an atomic reactor, for example, by its size and shape.

Unless both the United States and the Soviet Union seize immediately upon the opportunities opened up by reconnaissance satellites, they may miss the chance for a strategic arms control agreement. In the not too distant future, both sides are going to begin mounting multiple warheads on their intercontinental ballistic missiles and once that happens the chance will have been lost for monitoring an agreement with reconnaissance satellites because the satellites can only detect the missile silo—not the number of warheads on the missile. Both sides then will have been pushed back into the quagmire of on-site inspections.

—JOHN W. FINNEY